Abstract
Introduction
In a corporation, where the separation between ownership and control exists, agency problems may arise because the management may not behave in the best interests of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Given this condition, internal and external corporate governance mechanisms play important roles in minimizing the principal-agent conflicts. These governance mechanisms include ownership structure, board size, board independence, board meetings, and auditor choice, among others, which are well-established in the literature. Another governance mechanism gaining wider and wider attention in the literature is the compensation of board members or top executives, which is also viewed as an important tool in minimizing the agency problems (Dong and Ozkan, 2008) . The compensation scheme is considered significant to motivate executives to perform their managerial duties in line with the best interests of the shareholders, as well as to recruit and maintain high-quality managers (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003) .
Following widespread calls for better corporate governance, executive compensation is more and more widely addressed in the literature. As counted by Hallock and Murphy (1999) , studies on executive pay in the United States have grown from one or two papers per year before 1985 to sixty papers in 1995. In the financial economics literature, mostly based on the agency theory, scholars have attempted to investigate the linkage between compensation structure and a number of variables, such as firm performance (e.g. Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Bushman et al., 1996) , corporate governance structure (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Newman and Mozes, 1999) , capital structure (John and John, 1993) , and investment behavior (Bizjak et al., 1993) . In other disciplines, previous studies have investigated the association between executive pay and various aspects, including earnings management (Holthausen et al., 1995) , industrial regulation (Hubbard and Palia, 1995) , strategic interactions (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) , and social comparisons (O'Reilly et al., 1988) .
It is important to note that previous research on the determinants of compensation structure is largely dominated by US studies. Public disclosure of executive compensation in the US has long been regulated (Andjelkovic et al., 2002; Brunello et al., 2001) , resulting in an extensive body of empirical studies using the country's data. On the other hand, such studies outside the US are relatively limited, partly due to data availability issues (Unite et al., 2008) . Empirical evidence from developed markets is provided by studies in the context of the United Kingdom (Laing and Weir, 1999) , Japan (Basu et al., 2007) , Italy (Brunello et al., 2001) , Germany (Kaplan, 1998) , and Hong Kong (Cheng and Firth, 2006) , among others. Such evidence from emerging markets, where public disclosure of executive compensation is relatively weaker, is unsurprisingly scarce. Researchers have conducted studies using the data from Bulgaria (Jones and Kato, 1996) , China , the Philippines (Unite et al., 2006) , and Malaysia (Abdullah, 2006; Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman, 2009 ), among others.
The purpose of the present study is to examine the determinants of board compensation of the Indonesian listed corporations. It also seeks to investigate how changes in firm performance lead to changes in board compensation. This study extends the existing literature by examining such an issue in a developing economy that has different regulatory and social environments from those of developed economies, where most previous research has been conducted. Indonesia, which is one of twenty largest economies in the world, has an emerging capital market that attracts growing foreign investments. Additionally, Indonesia provides interesting setting since it adopts a two-tier board system, like such countries as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and China, where corporations shall have supervisory and management boards. Hence, it extends the scope of previous studies that are mostly based on economies adopting a unitary board system. Further, as an emerging market, Indonesia already has a system of corporate governance regulations, but the practice is still relatively left behind international best practices.
Compensation structure of the Indonesian listed firms is a relatively well-kept secret and generally not disclosed to the public [1] . Further, as documented by Claessens et al. (2000) , most listed firms in Indonesia are family-controlled; probably making the secrecy of the compensation package is more prevalent.
I employ an unbalanced panel data set, which comprises 442 firm-year observations of 255 non-financial firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in the financial years 2005 and 2006 . I hypothesize that corporate governance structure, firm performance, and firm-specific characteristics are positively associated with the compensation structure. I provide empirical evidence that profitability, board size, and firm size are positively associated with compensation level. It is also found that smaller firms tend to expend higher proportion of their financial resources to reward their board members. Additionally, this study suggests that firm size and family control play important roles in explaining the relationship between board compensation and firm performance. Further, this paper also examines whether changes in financial performance and firm value lead to changes in board pay. From the final sample, I organize a balanced panel data set comprising 186 observations. It is revealed that changes in firm value are positively associated with changes in board compensation.
The present paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 describes the two-tier system and the disclosure practice of board compensation in Indonesia. Section 3 reviews prior studies and develops hypotheses. This is followed by Section 4, which describes the data and methodology used in this study. Empirical results and discussions are presented in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Two-tier system and board compensation disclosure in Indonesia
As regulated in the county's Corporation Law enacted in 1995, Indonesian corporations shall have two boards in their organizational structures, namely Dewan Komisaris ("Board of Commissioners", hereafter "BOC") and Direksi ("Board of Directors", hereafter "BOD") [2] . The members of these two boards are elected by the shareholders in their general meeting. While BOC is responsible to the shareholders, BOD is responsible to both BOC and the shareholders.
The membership of the two boards is separated, so that there is no role duality issue as found in unitary board structure.
BOC acts as the representatives of the shareholders and conducts supervising and advising roles on BOD. Thus, the function of BOC is totally non-executive. BOC members consist of independent members (from outside the firm) and non-independent members (affiliated to the firm). BOC is headed by a president commissioner, which is relatively equivalent to the board chairman in unitary board structure. The president commissioner may be elected from either independent or non-independent members of BOC. Applicable capital market regulations require listed firms to have independent commissioners of at least 30 percent of the number of BOC members. BOD, whose members are highest-level managers, conducts the day-to-day management of the corporation. It is headed by a president director, which is equivalent to the chief executive officer (CEO) in unitary board structure.
As regulated in the Corporation Law, the shareholders in their general meeting make decisions on the compensation structure of board members. Capital market regulations have required the Indonesian listed firms to disclose the total compensation of board members, but do not require the disclosure of compensation for each individual member. As such, detailed disclosure of individual board member compensation is voluntary. In 2006, Indonesia's National Committee on Governance Policy (Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance or KNKG), an independent committee initiated by the government, issued Guidelines on Good Corporate Governance. These guidelines are intended as recommendations for the implementation of good corporate governance (GCG), especially for publicly-listed firms. The guidelines recommend the establishment of a nomination and remuneration committee, whose members are totally independent or from outside the firm. The committee is established to assist BOC in nominating future board members and determining appropriate compensation level for board members. The guidelines recommend firms to include GCG Report as a part of their annual reports. Board remuneration policies and levels are also recommended to be reported in the GCG Report.
Literature review and hypotheses development

Theoretical framework
In modern corporations, where the separation between the shareholders and the managers exists (Berle and Means, 1932) , managers may have incentives that are different from those of the shareholders, leading them to making decisions that are not in line with the shareholders' interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) address this issue as the principal-agent problem and then formalize the agency theory. They argue that "it is generally impossible for the principal and the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's viewpoint" (p. 5). Managers may pursue their own personal interests such as salary, job security, and prestige, which could be contradicting the interest of the shareholders, who want their wealth to be maximized (Mak and Li, 2001) . However, it is important to note that this principal-agent conflict seem to appear in corporations whose ownership structure is dispersed. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) contend that in corporations with concentrated ownership structure, such problems exist between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, where the former can expropriate the firm's assets in the expense of the latter.
Corporate governance mechanisms are intended to minimize the agency conflicts. In other words, the purpose of such mechanisms is to encourage managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders. Denis (2001) provides examples of such mechanisms, such as bonding managers contractually, monitoring them, and providing them with incentives for their good performance.
In this case, compensation schemes for executives have an important role. As argued by John and John (1993) , executive compensation plays important roles in aligning incentives of the management with those of the shareholders, as well as to mitigate risk-shifting incentives. Conyon and He (2004) , summarizing the propositions of previous work, state that executive compensation package is optimally determined by the board of directors based on economic determinants, the nature of agency conflicts, and difficulties in monitoring. Some firms also use compensation consultants and peer groups in determining the remuneration scheme (Bizjak et al., 2008) .
Since the goal of a firm is to increase shareholders wealth, executive compensation structure should be determined on the basis of shareholders wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 ).
Hence, compensation structure would appear to be powerful incentives for managers to increase firm value. Additionally, Holmstrom (1979) contends that compensation structure should be ideally based on performance measures that are as informative as possible. Compensation scheme on the basis of observable performance measures is expected to align the interests of the shareholders and the management (Brunello et al., 2001 ). The change in compensation level based on the change in firm performance, which is commonly called as "pay-performance sensitivity", also gains wider and wider attention from researchers in the literature.
Corporate governance structure, which includes board and ownership characteristics, is also viewed as significant determinants of compensation structure. Boards of directors are expected to have independent directors with certain experiences and expertise to better monitor the management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and to protect the rights of minority shareholders.
As addressed in a number of studies, board structure plays an important role in determining compensation structure. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that decisions on compensation structure should be made by independent directors, because they are better able to make unbiased opinions. On the other hand, Crystal (1991) argues that the decisions on compensation structure made by outside directors are ineffective because those directors are essentially hired by the CEO. This condition leads to remuneration scheme that is suboptimal for the firm, but advantageous for the CEO (Core et al., 1999) . To the best of my knowledge, the propositions on the role of ownership structure in determining compensation level are scarce in the literature. According to Cheng and Firth (2006) , board members or top managers that have the firm's shareholdings seem to have lower compensation due to large dividend payouts and the avoidance of adverse publicity, but they may also have higher compensation since they can use their voting rights to reward themselves higher.
Further, firm-specific characteristics may also have significant influences on the level of executive compensation. As summarized by Brunello et al. (2001) and Firth et al. (1999) , it is common that the level of top executive pay is positively associated with firm size. In a competitive market for managers, higher-quality people may be allocated to top-level positions in large firms (Rosen, 1992) . Large firms generally have a more extensive organizational hierarchy, where there are different compensation schemes for each managerial level (Simon, 1957) . Additionally, it is common that larger firms have higher absolute profit compared to their smaller counterparts. Hence, high level of executive compensation in a large firm may appear to be insignificant compared to the firm's total operational expenses (Firth et al., 1999) . Holmstrom (1979) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that it is appropriate for firms to determine director compensation level based on the firm performance. This means that board members should be better paid for their good performance. Previous studies use various measures of firm performance as the determinant of compensation level of board members or executives, including return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Tobin's Q, and stock returns.
Firm performance and compensation level
A number of studies provide evidence on the positive association between accountingbased performance (such as ROA and ROE) and the level of CEO pay, such as Sanders and Carpenter (1998) , Laing and Weir (1999) , Newman and Mozes (1999) , Zhou (2000) , Andjelkovic et al. (2002) , and Cheng and Firth (2006) . Other studies also find positive relationships between the level of CEO pay and market-based performance (Tobin's Q and stock returns), including Bustman et al. (1996) , Chung and Pruitt (1996) , Conyon and Peck (1998) , Core et al. (1999) , Vafeas (2003) , and Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) . A different result is suggested by Jiang et al. (2009) , which find that CEO pay is negatively related to ROA. It is important to note that these studies are based on samples in few countries such as the US and the UK, where the pay level of board members and top executives, including CEO, are commonly disclosed by listed firms.
In countries where the disclosure of countries level tends to be weaker, researchers use other proxies to measure the pay level, such as total board compensation and average director compensation. Andreas et al. (2010) , addressing German companies, find that ROA is positively associated with average director compensation. Using total board compensation as the proxy for pay level, Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009) also indicate the positive relationship in the context of Malaysia. Based on the data of Japanese firms, Basu et al. (2007) find that ROA and market-to-book ratio positively and significantly affect total executive compensation.
In the Indonesian case, I posit a direct relationship between firm performance and compensation level. Firms with higher level of performance may appreciate their board members with higher level of compensation. Many Indonesian studies (e.g. Darmadi, 2011) show that better performance are likely to belong to larger firms, which probably have more financial resources to pay their board members. The large firms may be also more attractive for highquality managers, which tend to be more highly-compensated. I formulate the first and second hypotheses as follows:
H1a: There is a positive association between profitability (accounting-based performance) and compensation level.
H2a: There is a positive association between firm value (market-based performance) and compensation level. Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Dalton et al. (1999) suggest that board size is one of the important determinants of effective governance. It is argued that larger groups have more skills and expertise that are required to solve problems (Jackson, 1992) . The relationship between board size and firm performance is well-established in the literature (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Coles et al., 2008) , yet relatively few studies hypothesize that board size has a significant influence on compensation level. Using samples of US firms, Core et al. (1999) and Conyon and He (2004) find that the influence of board size on the compensation level is significantly positive. Additionally, Sanders and Carpenter (1998) provide evidence that the size of top management team positively influences the level of CEO pay.
Board structure and compensation level
Within the context of Indonesia, it is expected that firms with larger board size tend to have more financial resources to hire more people serving on their boards. Darmadi (2011) suggests that firms with larger board size are likely to have larger firm size. Given this condition, I posit that board size positively influences the compensation. Hence, the hypothesis is stated as:
H3a: There is a positive between board size and compensation level.
As abovementioned, different arguments persist in the literature on whether independent directors better determine executive compensation. Arguing that independent directors conduct better monitoring on the board compensation, Firth et al. (1999) For the Indonesian case, we predict that the relationship between the fraction of independent members on BOC and the compensation level is positive. Such an environment in Indonesia seems to be relatively similar to that in Hong Kong, where the management typically nominates the independent directors, which can later encourage higher compensation for the management (Cheng and Firth, 2006) . Further, Darmadi (2011) suggests that higher proportion of independent commissioners tends to belong to larger firms. As such, it is hypothesized that:
H4a: There is a positive association between the proportion of independent commissioners and compensation level.
Ownership structure and compensation level
Concentrated ownership is viewed as one of the important governance mechanisms to minimize agency problems (Kaplan and Minton, 2004) and to better monitor the management (Shivdasani, 1993) , but it can also lead to asset expropriation tendency of the controlling shareholder (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Concentrated ownership may affect the design of compensation level in a firm. A number of previous studies have documented a negative association between blockholders ownership and the compensation level (e.g. Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1995; Core et al., 1999; Cheng and Firth, 2006) .
As indicated by Claessens et al. (2000) , concentrated ownership is common in firms listed on East Asian capital markets, including Indonesia. Again, I base my hypothesis on the correlation between concentrated ownership and firm size. As suggested by Darmadi (2011), higher level of concentrated ownership is more likely to exist among smaller firms, which may have lower compensation level than their larger counterparts. Therefore, my hypothesis is:
H5a: There is a negative association between concentrated ownership and compensation level.
The proportion of shares held by board members or the management may affect the pay level, either positively or negatively (Cheng and Firth, 2006) . Some studies show that insider ownership positively influences the compensation level, such as Basu et al. (2007) , Li et al. (2007) , and Byrd et al. (2010) .Other research, however, provides evidence on the negative relationship between insider ownership and pay level. Such studies include Mehran (1995 ), Core et al. (1999 , Firth et al. (1999) , and Andreas et al. (2010) .
In the Indonesian setting, where shareholdings in the name of insiders are quite uncommon, it is expected that insider ownership negatively affects compensation level. It seems that insider ownership is more common in family-controlled firms, where the insiders tend to have family relationships with the founder or the controlling shareholder. They may increase their wealth from larger dividend payouts rather than higher salary. This prediction leads me to formulate the following hypothesis:
H6a: There is a negative association between board members ownership and compensation level. Claessens et al. (2000) also show that listed firms in East Asian capital markets are mainly family controlled. Thus, people serving in the boardroom are partly due to family relationships with the founder or the controlling shareholder. To a particular extent, the control of a firm in the hand of family tends to lead to weaker monitoring mechanisms on the management. Similar to Hypothesis 6, I predict that family control has a negative impact on compensation level. It is predicted that the controlling family increases the wealth of the board members from sources other than the remuneration scheme. Additionally, family-controlled firms tend to be smaller firms (Darmadi, 2011) , which have relatively less financial resources to hire people serving on the board. Hence, it is hypothesized that:
H7a: There is a negative association between family control and compensation level.
Firm-specific characteristics and compensation level
Previous studies on the board compensation generally find that firm size is positively associated with the compensation level. Simon (1957) , Rosen (1992) , and Firth et al. (1999) provide arguments on this finding as abovementioned. Additionally, larger firms are likely to have more financial resources to hire more high-quality people holding seats in their boardrooms. Further, larger firms tend to have higher level of business risks and diversification, thus they compensate their board members and executives higher to handle their complex and highly-skilled jobs. Following prior findings, I hypothesize that:
H8a: There is a positive association between firm size and compensation level.
H9a: There is a positive association between business complexity and compensation level.
I also consider the firm's debt as a significant determinant of the pay level. Using the Hong Kong data, Cheng and Firth (2006) do not find any significant link between leverage and CEO pay. Additionally, Abdullah (2006) find that financially-distressed Malaysian listed firms pay their directors significantly lower than their peers.
For the Indonesian case, even though the managers of financially-distressed firms have to deal with difficult jobs to make the firms healthier, I predict that those firms may not have a considerable amount of financial resources to pay their managers. Hence, following Abdullah (2006) , it is hypothesized that:
H10a: There is a negative association between firm leverage and compensation level.
Determinants of compensation spending
Different from other studies, Byrd et al. (2010) define CEO pay to be average compensation paid to the CEO relative to firm size. This variable allows them to examine the determinants of the compensation level a firm pays to its CEO, compared to its own financial resources. Investigation on the determinants of compensation spending, relative to firm size, may provide interesting insights to answer the question of why the firm spends certain proportion of its financial resources to pay its board members or CEO. As suggested by Firth et al. (1999) , even though larger firms provide their board members with higher absolute value of compensation level, this amount is probably insignificant compared to their larger business scale.
Hypotheses 1a through 10a, which address the determinants of compensation level, are mostly formulated by considering firm size. Taking this into account, I further formulate Hypotheses 1b trough 10b on the determinants of compensation spending relative to firm size (not stated here). However, considering the proposition of Firth et al. (1999) , the hypothesized signs for compensation spending are the opposite of those for compensation level. For instance, while the association between firm size and compensation level is positive, it is predicted that firm size is negatively associated with compensation spending relative to firm size.
Research design
Sample description
To capture the recent development in the determinants of board compensation, I collect the observations. The data are mainly obtained from the IDX Watch, previously published as the JSX Watch, an annual capital market directory issued by Bisnis Indonesia, a prominent business newspaper in the country. Additionally, some of the data are also hand-collected from the annual reports and financial statements of the sample firms, which are downloadable from the Internet. Table 1 shows selection process and industry breakdown of the sample firms.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Regression model
Previous studies employ different estimation technique in their multivariate analysis, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS), and fixed effects. In the present study, I mainly employ OLS regressions, following Firth et al. (1999) and Unite et al. (2008) that also use two-year data. Moreover, similar to Coles et al. (2008) , it is argued that the variations in compensation level tend to appear in the cross-section rather than in the time-series, hence OLS is considered more appropriate. In analyzing the determinants of board compensation, the econometric model is specified as follows:
Next, I examine pay-performance sensitivity, which addresses whether changes in performance and other firm characteristics have positive impacts on changes in pay. Similar to Shaw and Zhang (2010) , I use percentage of the changes instead of absolute values of such changes. The following model is also employed:
Variable measurement
In countries where the disclosure of individual executive compensation is common, such as the US, the UK, and Australia, researchers commonly use pay level of CEO or each individual executive as the dependent variable in their regression models. In such studies as Core et al. (1999) and Clarkson et al. (2006) , regressions are even conducted separately for different types of CEO compensation, namely salary, cash, and bonus. Indonesia is among countries with relatively weak disclosure of board compensation. The country's capital market regulations only require listed firms to disclose the aggregate amount of compensation rewarded to the members of BOC and BOD.
In this study, I use two proxies for compensation level. First, I employ total compensation paid to board members, as reported by listed firms in notes to the financial statements. Using publicly-available data, this aggregate amount seems to be the most reasonable choice. I handcollect annual reports of 143 firms included in my sample, and find that there are only ten firms disclosing the compensation of each individual board member. The total compensation is also used in previous studies, such as Adams (2003), Unite et al. (2008) , and Abdul-Wahab and Abdul-Rahman (2009). Second, I use average compensation level for each individual board member, which is obtained by dividing total compensation divided by the number of people serving on BOC and BOD. A number of studies employ this average pay level, including Muslu (1998), Firth et al. (1999) , and Andreas et al. (2010) . Further, following Byrd et al. (2010) , another dependent variable used here is compensation spending, which is obtained by dividing total compensation paid to board members by the firm's book value of assets. Table 2 shows the description of research variables. I include independent variables on firm performance, board structure, ownership ownership, and firm-specific characteristics in our models. The numbers of business segments and subsidiaries are used as proxies for business complexity. Additionally, concentrated ownership is measured using the proportions of common shares held by the largest shareholder and blockholders. Following previous studies (Mak and Kusnadi, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) , blockholders are defined as shareholders who own 5 percent of common shares or more.
In determining whether a firm is family-controlled, relatively similar to some prior studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Achmad, 2006) , I classify the sample firms into four groups based on the largest shareholder. The types of the largest shareholder are foreign institutions, government entities, domestic non-business entities (cooperatives and foundations), and domestic business entities. Firms whose the largest shareholder is domestic business entities are considered family-controlled firms, except in pyramiding and cross-shareholding cases [3] .
[Insert Table 2 about here] Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of variables used in the present study. Total board compensation (TOTCOM) is found to vary greatly, ranging from Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 49 million to IDR 297 billion per annum. Accordingly, such a great variability is also found in average board compensation (AVECOM). Further, the sample firms on average expend 0.9 percent of the book value of their assets to compensate their board members (COM/ASSET). [Insert Table 3 about here] those larger firms may also attract high-quality managers and provide them with higher pay level. In terms of compensation spending (the ratio of total board compensation to total assets), smaller firms expend significantly higher than their larger counterparts to pay their board members. Thus, this confirms the proposition of Firth et al. (1999) that board pay in larger firms seems to be insignificant compared to their large business scale.
Empirical results and discussions
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
As indicated by previous
Panel B differentiates between family-controlled and non-family-controlled firms. As previously defined, a firm is considered family-controlled if its largest shareholder is a domestic business entity, except in pyramiding and cross-shareholding cases. The total assets of nonfamily firms are significantly larger than their family-controlled counterparts, implying that family-controlled firms are likely to be smaller ones. Accordingly, total board compensation and ROA of family-controlled firms are found to be significantly lower. In addition, compensation spending, relative to total assets, of family-controlled firms is significantly higher than that of non-family firms, but the difference is marginally significant at the 0.10 level.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results of correlation analysis, using Pearson correlation coefficients, are reported in Table 5 . It is revealed that TOTCOM is positively related to ASSET, implying that larger firms expend higher absolute value of money to pay their board members. ASSET is found to be positively correlated with four variables, namely ROA, BDSIZE, BUSSEGM, and SUBSID.
Accordingly, these four variables are positively associated with TOTCOM. These findings imply that that higher absolute value of board compensation is likely to be expended by larger firms, which are characterized by higher profitability, larger board size, and greater numbers of business segments and subsidiaries. Further, ASSET has a negative association with FAMILY, suggesting that family-controlled firms are likely to be smaller firms. In line with this, the correlation between FAMILY and TOTCOM is found to be negative.
In terms of compensation expenditure relative to total assets (COM/ASSET), the table shows that smaller firms spend higher proportion of their assets to pay their board members, which can be seen from the negative correlation between ASSET and COM/ASSET. Smaller board size, which is more likely to belong to smaller firms, is also significantly correlated with higher COM/ASSET. Again, this confirms the proposition of Firth et al. (1999) that higher absolute value of board compensation in large firms is insignificant compared to their larger business scale. Table 5 shows that both ASSET and BDSIZE have positive relationships with business complexity, as measured by the numbers of business segments (BUSSEGM) and subsidiaries (SUBSID). This result seems to suggest that larger firms employ more people on the board to better deal with higher level of business complexity, and they thereby are willing to allocate more financial resources to compensate their board members.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Determinants of board compensation
I further conduct multivariate regression analyses to examine the impacts of firm performance, board structure, ownership structure, and firm-specific characteristics on board compensation. Before the regressions are run, the models need to be tested first to make sure that they do not suffer from multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation problems. I deal with potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems by using White or Newey-West standard error estimates, as suggested by Brooks (2008) . In terms of multicollinearity, Wooldridge (2003) explains that the actual magnitude of a multicollinearity problem is not welldefined. The results of the correlation analysis, as reported in Table 5 , generally indicate that multicollinearity problems do not exist.
To capture potential differences in compensation level across industries and years, I include industry and year dummy variables, as suggested by Basu et al. (2007) . For all models, I use robust t-statistics, based on Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. Based on Equation (1), the regression result of the determinants of compensation level is reported in Table 6 . Models (1) and (2) indicate quite similar results, with Model (1) showing stronger explanatory power.
From these three models, a positive and statistically significant coefficient is reported for Table 5 . These larger firms probably have more financial resources to compensate their board members and top executives.
With respect to board structure, I find that both BDSIZE and BOCINDEP are positively related to compensation level. As such, Hypotheses 3a and 4a are supported. Again, size of the firm may explain these positive associations. As presented in Table 5 , the two variables are positively correlated with ASSET at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively. This implies that firms hiring greater number of board members and higher proportion of independent commissioners, which are likely to have larger size, tend to allocate higher absolute value of their financial resources for compensation. The positive association between board size and compensation level confirms the findings of Sanders and Carpenter (1998) and Core et al. (1999) . These large firms may also have more financial resources to recruit greater number of and higher-quality independent commissioners. Another possible interpretation is that independent commissioners may be dominated by the management and non-independent commissioners in terms of the arrangement of pay level, given a particular level of business complexity of the firm. This is consistent with the finding of Core at al. (1999) and Li et al. (2007) , which use the data from the US and China, respectively.
Further, I find weak evidence on the association between ownership structure and the compensation level. Consistent with my expectation, blockholders ownership (as a proxy for concentrated ownership) has a negative association with the compensation package at the 0.10 level. From the theoretical viewpoint, this finding may imply that concentrated ownership in Indonesia seems to be more efficient in monitoring and, thus, discouraging higher level of compensation. However, in the case of Indonesia, I believe that firm size contributes to explaining this positive association. Blockholders ownership is more prevalent in smaller firms, which can be seen from a negative and significant correlation between BLOCK and ASSET as presented in Table 5 . These smaller firms probably have lower level of business complexity and, hence, pay their board members lower than their larger counterparts. Board members ownership (BDOWN) and family control (FAMILY) are found to have insignificant impacts on the pay level.
It should be noted that the influence of family control on compensation level, though significant, is positive. The positive sign is contrary to that hypothesized. This may partly indicate that the expropriation of assets by the controlling shareholder, which can be seen from the relatively excessive compensation for board members, persists in family-controlled firms.
Supporting Hypothesis 8a, firm size (ASSET) has a positive and significant relationship with compensation level. This finding is then consistent with the result of many studies previously conducted. Larger firms may have more financial resources to hire greater number of high-quality people serving in their boardrooms. Further, larger firms tend to have higher level of business risks and diversification, thus they compensate their board members and executives higher to handle such complex and highly-skilled jobs. Hypothesis 9a is also supported. This supports my abovementioned view that firm size plays an important role in explaining the significance of variables in our models in determining compensation level. Larger firms in Indonesia tend to have greater number of business segments and subsidiaries. Hence, BUSSEGM and SUBSID positively influence pay level, though marginally significant at the 0.10 level.
Finally, contrary to my expectation, the level of firm leverage (LEVRG) has an insignificant association with pay level. Hence, financially-distressed firms pay their board members neither significantly higher nor lower compared to their healthier counterparts.
Using compensation spending relative to firm size (COM/ASSET) as the dependent variable, I report the regression results in Model (3) of Table 6 It is found that board ownership is negatively associated with COM/ASSET, suggesting that board members do not benefit from its share ownership to allocate more resources to reward themselves. The increase of their wealth may also be obtained from other sources, such as dividend payouts for themselves as the shareholders, as well as control of the firm in the hand of their family. The latter example is more prevalent in family-controlled firms, where family members of the controlling shareholder are commonly involved as the members of BOC and BOD (Achmad, 2006) .
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Pay-performance relationship: Do firm size and family control matter?
In Table 7 . For the sake of brevity, I use two dependent variables only, namely TOTCOM and COM/ASSET. Models (1) and (3) report the results considering firm size, while the results involving family control are shown in Models (2) and (4).
The results reveal that firm size and family control are significant determinants of payperformance relationship. Firm size significantly explains the relationship between Tobin's Q and total board compensation. This implies that among larger firms, higher compensation level is associated with higher market value. Larger firms tend to dominate the trading on the stock exchange, resulting in wider coverage by analysts and the media (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006 ) and higher demand by investors. Thus, it is not uncommon that market prices of large firms' shares are far exceeding their par values. From my finding, it is found that board members of larger firm are paid higher when the firm value is higher. Further, the interaction of ROA and LARGE is negatively associated with COM/ASSET.
Differently, family control significantly and positively influences the relationship between accounting profitability and total board compensation, though marginally significant at the 0.10 level. Hence, among family-controlled firms, board members are paid higher as the profitability increases. In such firms, where the family control is prevalent, profitability seems to be an important issue in determining the board pay. Board members are rewarded more for their success in generating profit. However, both firm size and family control are found not to significantly influence the relationship between firm performance and COM/ASSET.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Pay-performance sensitivity
Similar to a number of studies in the literature, I examine whether changes in firm performance lead to changes in the compensation level. The results of this examination are presented in Table 8 . For all models, I include industry dummies and use robust t-statistics based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. It can be seen that Models (1) and (2) have weak explanatory powers (p-values of the F-statistics are greater than 0.10). Even though these two models are not good enough to explain the variability of changes in board compensation level, it is found that changes in Tobin's Q are positively associated with changes in total board compensation, as shown in Model (1). This suggests that enhanced firm value appears to be the firm's consideration to increase the pay level of their board members. This may be related to the goal of the firm, which is maximizing the wealth of its shareholders. Thus, when firm value (Tobin's Q) is enhanced, the shareholders seem to appreciate the performance of the board members and then increase their compensation. This finding is in line with previous empirical evidence, such as Firth et al. (2006) and Merhebi (2006) , who find that the increase of the shareholders' wealth has a positive and significant relationship with the increase of CEO pay.
On the other hand, changes in profitability (ROA) are not significantly associated with such changes in the compensation level, implying that firm value is considered more important in reflecting the performance of board members.
As reported in Model (3) of Table 8 , changes in Tobin's Q are again found to be positively related to the changes in compensation spending relative to firm size (ChCOM/ASSET). It is important to note that Model (3) is highly significant (F-statistic = 139.755) in explaining the variability of ChCOM/ASSET. As such, when the firm value is enhanced, it seems that the shareholders are happy to expend increased proportion of the firm's assets to reward their board members. Additionally, changes in ROA are also marginally significant at the 0.10 level. This implies that to a particular extent, the increase of profitability may be behind the decision of the shareholders to increase the compensation spending, relative to firm size, for board members.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Next, I examine the impacts of firm size and family control on the pay-performance sensitivity. The results are reported in Table 9 . Again, for the sake of brevity, the dependent variables employed here are TOTREM and COM/ASSET. Models (1) and (3) involve the interaction between firm size and changes in firm performance, while the interaction between family control and changes in firm performance are reported in Models (2) and (4).
In terms of total board compensation, firm size is not significant in explaining the payperformance sensitivity. On the other hand, family control is significant at the 0.05 level in explaining the relationship between changes in Tobin's Q and changes in board pay. This implies that the positive influence of changes in Tobin's Q on changes in total board compensation is stronger in family-controlled firms. These firms, which may not be widely covered by the analysts and highly-demanded by investors, might see the increase in firm value as an extraordinary achievement, so that they increase the level of compensation paid to their board members. I find the same condition when considering changes in compensation spending. Firm size is again found not to be significant in explaining the association between changes in firm performance and changes in compensation spending. Similar to the finding in Model (2), the positive effect of the changes in firm value on changes in compensation spending is stronger in family-controlled firms. Different from the other three models, the F-statistic of Model (4) suggests that the model is very good in explaining variability of the compensation spending changes. Further, findings reported in Table 9 also generally suggest that neither firm size nor family control is significant to explain the sensitivity between profitability and board compensation.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Concluding remarks
Previous research on board and executive pay is mostly based on developed economies. This paper extends the existing literature by investigating the determinants of board compensation in a developing country that adopts a two-tier board system and has a weaker disclosure environment. Being one of twenty largest economies in the world, Indonesia is one of the main emerging markets in Asia and attracts growing foreign portfolio investments. It is hypothesized that firm performance, board structure, ownership structure, and firm-specific characteristics are significantly associated with board compensation. This study uses three different dependent variables, namely total board compensation, average board compensation, and compensation spending relative to total assets. employed as the dependent variable, it is found that firm size and ROA are negatively associated with the expenditure. Family control, which is less prevalent in large firms, is found to be positively significant. Again, firm size plays an important role in interpreting the results. Even though larger firms provide higher compensation level for their board members, the amount is considered insignificant compared to their total assets, as suggested by Firth et al. (1999) . On the other hand, family-controlled firms, which are likely to be smaller ones, tend to expend higher proportion of their financial resources to compensate their boards.
In the pay-performance analysis, my results reveal a number of major findings. First, firm size positively influences the relationship between Tobin's Q and compensation level. This suggests that among large firms, firm value is considered important in determining the board pay. Differently, family control is found to positively affect the association between ROA and pay level at the 0.10 level. As such, in firms where the family control is prevalent, profitability seems to be an important issue in determining the board pay. Second, based on 186 crosssectional observations, it is found that changes in total compensation level and spending have positive and significant relationships with changes in Tobin's Q. The shareholders may appreciate the management and board members for the increases in firm value and their wealth, leading to the increases in compensation level and spending. This pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in family-controlled firms.
This research is subject to some limitations. First, it only employs the data for two financial years. Hence, future research needs to use longer time span to provide more powerful insights into the determinants of board compensation. Second, OLS is mainly used as a tool in the multivariate regression analyses in this study. Using longer time span, more sophisticated estimation techniques may need to be employed to check the robustness of the results.
My results may also bring some practical implications. Based on the findings of my payperformance analysis, this seems that top management of the Indonesian listed firms tends to be relatively less rewarded for the improvement of firm performance. This research then confirms the importance of a remuneration committee, which is expected to provide independent recommendations on the appropriate level of compensation for top managers based on their performance. However, in smaller firms, the costs to establish and maintain such a committee may outweigh the benefits. In this case, independent commissioners on BOC are expected to play such a role.
Notes
[1] From my observation, there are very few listed firms that disclose the details of compensation structure and levels for each individual board member.
[2] The use of the term "Board of Directors" within the context of Indonesia's two-tier system is obviously different from that in the unitary board system. Since BOD in Indonesia conducts the day-to-day management of the firm, it is relatively equivalent to top management team in the unitary system.
[3] I recognize that this identification method may be ambiguous to a particular extent.
Descriptive statistics in Table 3 shows that 58 percent of our observations are familycontrolled. Based on a sample of 178 Indonesian listed firms for the financial year 1996, Claessens et al. (2000) documented that 69 percent of those firms are family-controlled. Hence, I consider my identification method relatively appropriate. Following La Porta et al. (1999) , a firm's structure is a pyramid if there is at least one listed firm between it and the ultimate owner in the chain of control; while in a cross-shareholding, a listed firm own shares in its controlling shareholders (another listed firm) or in the firms along the chain of control. Claessens et al. (2000) suggest that pyramid structure and cross-shareholdings are common in East Asian capital markets. TOTCOM is natural log of total board compensation. AVECOM is average board compensation. COM/ASSET is total board compensation divided by the book value of assets. ROA is return on assets. TOBINQ is natural log of the ratio of market value to the book value of assets. BDSIZE is natural log of the number of people serving on the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and and the Board of Directors (BOD). BOCINDEP is the proportion of independent commissioners on BOC. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares held by blockholders (shareholders who own 5 percent or more). BDOWN is the proportion of common shares held by the members of BOC and BOD. FAMILY is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is family-controlled and 0 otherwise. ASSET is natural log of the book value of assets. LEVRG is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BUSSEGM is natural log of the number of business segments. SUBSID is the number of subsidiaries. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Table 6 Regression of board compensation on firm performance, board structure, ownership structure, and firmspecific characteristics
This table reports OLS regressions of the board compensation on firm performance, board structure, ownership structure, and firm-specific variables. The dependent variables of Models (1), (2), and (3) are TOTCOM, AVECOM, and COM/ASSET, respectively. TOTCOM is natural log of total board compensation. AVECOM is natural log of average board compensation. COM/ASSET is total board compensation divided by the book value of assets. ROA is return on assets. TOBINQ is natural log of the ratio of market value to the book value of assets. BDSIZE is natural log of the number of people serving on the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and and the Board of Directors (BOD). BOCINDEP is the proportion of independent commissioners on BOC. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares held by blockholders (shareholders who own 5 percent or more). BDOWN is the proportion of common shares held by the members of BOC and BOD. FAMILY is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is family-controlled and 0 otherwise. LARGE is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is large (its book value of assets is greater than IDR 803 billion) and 0 otherwise. LEVRG is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BUSSEGM is natural log of the number of business segments. SUBSID is the number of subsidiaries. Robust t-statistics, based on heteroskedasticityand autocorrelation-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Table 7 The impacts of firm size and family control on pay-performance relationship
Independent variable Predicted sign
This table reports OLS regressions of the board compensation on firm performance, board structure, ownership structure, and firm-specific variables. The dependent variable of Models (1) and (2) is TOTCOM. The dependent variable of Models (3) and (4) is COMP/ASSET. TOTCOM is natural log of total board compensation. COM/ASSET is total board compensation divided by the book value of assets. ROA is return on assets. TOBINQ is natural log of the ratio of market value to the book value of assets. LARGE is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is large (its book value of assets is greater than IDR 803 billion) and 0 otherwise. FAMILY is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is family-controlled and 0 otherwise. BDSIZE is natural log of the number of people serving on the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and and the Board of Directors (BOD). BOCINDEP is the proportion of independent commissioners on BOC. BLOCK is the proportion of common shares held by blockholders (shareholders who own 5 percent or more). BDOWN is the proportion of common shares held by the members of BOC and BOD. LEVRG is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. BUSSEGM is natural log of the number of business segments. SUBSID is the number of subsidiaries. Robust t-statistics, based on heteroskedasticity-and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Independent variable
TOTCOM COM/ASSET
(1) (2) (3) (1), (2), and (3) are ChTOTCOM, ChAVECOM, and ChCOM/ASSET, respectively. ChTOTCOM is the change in total board compensation. ChAVEREM is the change in average board compensation. ChCOM/ASSET is the change in total board compensation spending, relative to the book value of assets. ChROA is the change in return on assets. ChTOBINQ is the change in Tobin's Q, which is defined to be the ratio of market value to the book value of assets. ChASSET is the change in the book value of assets. All changes are measured in percentage. Robust t-statistics, based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Table 9 The impacts of firm size and family control on pay-performance sensitivity
This table reports OLS regressions of changes in board compensation level on changes in firm performance The dependent variable of Models (1) and (2) is ChTOTCOM. The dependent variable of Models (3) and (4) is ChCOM/ASSET. ChTOTCOM is the change in total board compensation. ChCOM/ASSET is the change in total board compensation spending, relative to the book value of assets. ChROA is the change in return on assets.
ChTOBINQ is the change in Tobin's Q, which is defined to be the ratio of market value to the book value of assets. LARGE is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is large (its book value of assets is greater than IDR 803 billion) and 0 otherwise. FAMILY is a dichotomous variable, which equals if the firm is family-controlled and 0 otherwise. ChASSET is the change in the book value of assets. All changes are measured in percentage. Robust tstatistics, based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (one-tailed) at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Independent variable
ChTOTCOM
ChCOM/ASSET
(1) (2) (3) 
